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CHALLENGES FACING JUDGES REGARDING 
EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 
Paul W. Grimm* 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 the role of trial judges in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony has become familiar.  Trial judges are to be 
the “gatekeepers” standing between the parties, who naturally offer the most 
impressive experts they can find or afford and are willing to advance their 
theory of the case, and the jury, who must come to grips with scientific, 
technical, or other specialized information that usually is completely 
unfamiliar to them.  The judge’s gatekeeper role is imposed by Federal Rule 
of Evidence 104(a), which provides, in essence, that the trial judge must 
decide preliminary issues about the admissibility of evidence, the 
qualification of witnesses, and the existence of any privileges.2  When 
applying this Rule with respect to experts, we are further informed by Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702.  As amended in 2000 to implement Daubert, Rule 702 
instructs that when scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge would 
assist the finder of fact in understanding the evidence or making a factual 
determination, a witness qualified by virtue of knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise, 
provided (1) the testimony is sufficiently based on facts or data, (2) any 
opinions expressed are the result of reliable principles or methodology, and 
(3) the witness reliably has applied the principles or methodology to the facts 
of the case.3  Regarding the reliability factors, Daubert and its progeny4 
identify a number of subfactors that a court may need to consider:  whether 
the methodology has been tested, its error rate, whether it has been subject to 
peer review, whether it is generally accepted as reliable among practitioners 
 
*  United States District Judge, District of Maryland.  The opinions in this Article are mine 
alone.  This Article was prepared for the Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, 
and Rule 702, held on October 27, 2017, at Boston College School of Law.  The Symposium 
took place under the sponsorship of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence 
Rules.  For an overview of the Symposium, see Daniel J. Capra, Foreword:  Symposium on 
Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459 (2018). 
 
 1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 3. Id. r. 702. 
 4. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156–57 (1999); Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). 
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of the relevant field of science or technology, and whether (if they exist) 
standard testing protocols have been followed.5 
This seems straightforward; that is until one considers exactly what is 
involved.  First, the acceptable subjects for expert testimony encompass 
science, technology, and any other type of specialized knowledge beyond the 
understanding of the typical jury.6  That covers a lot of territory.  And, if the 
admissibility of expert testimony is conditioned on the notion that the jury 
needs help understanding evidence beyond its familiarity, why should it be 
assumed that the trial judge has any greater understanding than the jury?  
After all, most judges are generalists, and, if similar to me, do not regard 
themselves as specialists in science or technology, let alone the limitless 
types of “specialized” knowledge that may be relevant to a case (e.g., 
economics, accounting, business, finance, engineering, construction—the list 
is endless). 
Second, to do our jobs as required by Rule 702, we must find that the expert 
had sufficient facts or data on which to base her opinions, employed reliable 
principles or methodology, and then reliably applied the principles or 
methodology to the particular facts of the case.7  However, trial judges are 
privy to very few of the underlying facts of a case (whether civil or criminal) 
before the trial.  Indictments and civil pleadings are pretty sparse when it 
comes to factual particularity—that is what discovery is supposed to provide.  
But discovery requests and responses are not filed with the court,8 so by the 
time the case is ready for trial, all we know about the case is what we can 
glean from the filings that have been made before trial.  These tend to focus 
on specific legal issues rather than a panoramic view of the whole case.  So 
how are we—the least informed about the underlying facts when compared 
to the knowledge of the parties, counsel, and experts—to determine whether 
an expert considered sufficient facts or data? 
And even if we were omniscient about the facts, what qualifies us to 
determine whether the principles or methodology employed by an expert, 
whose field we do not know, is reliable and reliably applied to the facts?  
 
 5. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment.  The Advisory 
Committee notes also recognize additional factors that a court may want to consider, such as 
(1) whether the expert proposes to testify about facts derived from research independent of the 
litigation, as opposed to expressing opinions developed expressly for the litigation; (2) whether 
the expert “unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion”; 
(3) whether the expert “accounted for obvious alternative explanations”; (4) whether the expert 
is being as careful in reaching his opinions as he would be when doing his regular professional 
work outside of the litigation context; and (5) “[w]hether the field of expertise claimed by the 
expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert” intends to offer at 
trial. Id. 
 6. See id. r. 702(a). 
 7. See id. r. 702(b)–(d). 
 8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A)–(B) (noting that parties disclose expert discovery 
requests and responses to one another instead of filing them with the court); FED. R. CRIM. P. 
16(a)(1)(G) (noting that, at the defendant’s request, the government must provide the 
defendant, not the court, a summary of expert testimony it intends to use at trial); Id. r. 
16(b)(1)(C) (noting that, at the government’s request, the defendant must provide the 
government, not the court, a summary of expert testimony it intends to use at trial). 
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When it comes to the admissibility of expert evidence, trial judges can feel 
like they are in a battle of wits, unarmed. 
The skeptical reader will scoff and say: 
Stop feeling sorry for yourself; the information you need to determine the 
admissibility of expert evidence is provided to you in the form of discovery 
disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) and 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) and (b)(1)(C), and in 
motions in limine filed before trial challenging the admissibility (or seeking 
advance rulings of admissibility) of expert testimony! 
That is true, but only to a certain extent.  First, the parties must have properly 
made their expert disclosures,9 which they frequently do not.  Second, the 
issue of expert admissibility must be raised sufficiently far in advance of trial 
for the judge to digest the information, hold a hearing, if needed, and make a 
considered ruling.  That does not always happen, and it is not unusual to be 
confronted with an objection to expert testimony on the eve of trial or during 
it. 
Finally, with regard to criminal cases, the focus of this Article, judges face 
significant challenges in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony that 
do not occur in most civil cases.  This Article starts by describing these 
challenges and then offers some suggestions about what can be done to 
address them. 
I.  CHALLENGES TO MAKING GOOD EXPERT-ADMISSIBILITY 
RULINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES 
A.  The Right to a Speedy Trial 
The Sixth Amendment states that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”10  This right is 
implemented by the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.11  It provides, relevantly: 
In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant 
charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense 
shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making 
public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has 
appeared before a judicial officer . . . , whichever date last occurs.12 
However, there are many statutory exceptions to this seventy-day 
requirement13 and as a result most criminal cases do not, in fact, get tried 
within seventy days.  But, the right to a speedy trial animates the entire 
pretrial process in a criminal case in ways that do not occur in civil cases.  
The clock is always ticking, and the judge is expected to expedite the 
 
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G), (b)(1)(C). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2012). 
 12. Id. § 3161(c)(1). 
 13. Exceptions include, for example, delays resulting from competency examinations, 
interlocutory appeals, filing (and resolution) of pretrial motions, transfer of the defendant from 
one district to another, and consideration by the court of a proposed guilty plea. Id. § 3161(h). 
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proceedings.  This means that everything that must be done in preparation for 
trial, including making expert witness disclosures, must take place at an 
accelerated pace.  And when the many pretrial proceedings of a criminal case 
are accomplished within a compressed time frame, this puts pressure on both 
counsel and the court to get it all done correctly within the available time.  
When we are in a hurry, we are not always as careful, complete, or deliberate 
as we are when time is not an issue, and this can (and often does) affect when 
expert disclosures are made and how detailed they are.  Every trial judge is 
familiar with expert disclosures that are pro forma, incomplete, and 
conclusory, and those that are do not provide the detail needed for the judge 
to conduct a Rule 702 analysis properly. 
B.  The Breadth of Expert Testimony 
Introduced in Criminal Cases 
Everyone who has watched any of the myriad crime shows on television is 
familiar with the type of forensic evidence that can be offered into evidence 
and that experts can testify to in criminal cases:  fingerprint analysis; 
ballistics and toolmark evidence; DNA testing; footprint and tire-track 
evidence; hair and fiber analysis; bite-mark evidence; and handwriting 
evidence, to name a few.  But, recently I have come across or heard about 
even more subject matters that experts have testified to in criminal cases:  
mental health (i.e., competency and sanity issues); other medical conditions; 
coded language used by drug dealers; characteristics of gang activity; 
terrorist activities; characteristics of sex trafficking; reliability (or 
unreliability) of eyewitness identification; linguistic analytics; Bitcoin and 
other digital currencies; computer forensics; characteristics and operation of 
firearms and explosives; counterfeit currency; controlled substance analysis; 
the difference between personal use and distribution quantities of drugs; 
vulnerability of sex-trafficking victims; field sobriety testing in drunk-
driving cases; and operation of cell towers and other methods of locating 
individuals through tracking devices. 
Think about all these types of potential experts in criminal cases.  While 
doctors and psychologists may have standard methodology that they apply in 
reaching their decisions, what about gang experts, sex-trafficking experts, or 
coded-language experts?  It is unlikely that their methodology has been 
subject to peer review or that there are handy error rates to consider.  So how 
is the judge to assess the reliability of their methodology?  Further, many 
experts who testify in criminal cases are from law enforcement agencies—
government crime labs or criminal investigation agencies.  How does the 
judge evaluate potential bias that may affect the reliability of law 
enforcement experts?  The prevalence of “specialized” as opposed to 
“scientific” expert witness testimony in criminal cases presents unique 
challenges to a judge in determining admissibility. 
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C.  The Pressure on the Defendant 
to Plead and Plead Quickly 
There is tremendous pressure on a criminal defendant in federal court to 
plead guilty, and do so quickly.  This comes from the influence exerted on 
sentencing by the Sentencing Guidelines of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission.14  Even though, in the absence of a statutory requirement to 
impose a particular type of sentence in a criminal case (so-called “mandatory 
minimum” cases), the Sentencing Guidelines are just that—guidelines, not 
mandatory rules—the judge is required to properly calculate the guidelines 
in each case and consider them in imposing a particular sentence.15  And 
while the judge can depart up or down within the recommended guidelines 
sentence, or vary up or down to impose a sentence outside the guidelines 
range, it is reversible error not to begin the sentencing by correctly calculating 
the applicable guidelines range.16 
For those unfamiliar with the esoterica of the Sentencing Guidelines, the 
ultimate guidelines range is a function of two factors:  (1) the numerical 
offense level applicable to the crime(s) that the defendant pled to or was 
convicted of and (2) the numerical calculation applicable to the defendant’s 
criminal history.17  Offense levels range from one to forty-three, and criminal 
history levels range from I to VI.18  The higher the combined offense and 
criminal history scores, the greater the recommended range of the sentence.19  
And a two- or three-level reduction in offense level can make a huge 
difference in the recommended sentence, particularly at the high end of the 
Guidelines scale.20 
Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines allows defendants who plead guilty, 
thereby accepting responsibility, to receive a two-point reduction in offense 
level.21  If the unadjusted offense level is sixteen or greater and the defendant 
pleads guilty (thereby earning the two-point reduction), she can earn an 
additional one-point reduction in offense level if the government makes a 
motion at the time of sentencing, stating that “the defendant has assisted 
authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by 
timely notifying authorities of his intention to [plead guilty].”22  This would 
 
 14. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
 15. Id. § 1A2. 
 16. United States v. McManus, 734 F.3d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Although the 
sentencing guidelines are only advisory, improper calculation of a guideline range constitutes 
significant procedural error, making the sentence procedurally unreasonable and subject to 
being vacated.” (quoting United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
 17. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. For example, if a defendant has a guidelines score of offense level thirty-three and a 
criminal history score of III, her recommended sentence is 168 to 210 months. Id.  Drop the 
offense level by two points to thirty-one, and the range is 135 to 168 months. Id.  Drop the 
offense level by three points to thirty, and the range is 121 to 151 months. Id.  These 
differences are significant, especially for the defendant who will be serving the sentence. 
 21. Id. § 3E1.1(a). 
 22. Id. § 3E1.1(b). 
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relieve the government from having to prepare for trial.  So, there is intense 
pressure on a defendant charged with a federal offense to plead guilty before 
the government invests a lot of time responding to pretrial motions and 
preparing for trial, given the stakes at sentencing if the defendant goes to trial 
and is convicted, thus becoming ineligible for any section 3E1.1 reduction. 
This pressure plays out in the decision that a defense attorney has to make 
in providing effective representation to the defendant:  Does he demand that 
the government make full disclosure of all the information relating to its 
expert witnesses, then challenge any experts that seem vulnerable by filing a 
motion to exclude the expert’s testimony (thereby jeopardizing the section 
3E1.1(b) reduction)?  Or does he forgo doing so to preserve the additional 
reduction in offense level and plead guilty promptly (thereby giving up any 
chance of excluding expert testimony that may be critical to the government’s 
ability to prove a charge)?  This is a tough position for a defense attorney and 
defendant to be in, and guessing wrong can have serious consequences. 
Since the vast majority of criminal cases in federal court are disposed of 
by plea rather than trial (well above 90 percent, by most accounts),23 the 
frequency with which the government’s experts are challenged (thereby 
subjecting the sufficiency of their methodology and opinions to scrutiny by 
the court) is low.  When experts grow accustomed to not being challenged, 
their perception of the need to fully document and justify their methodology 
and opinions can diminish.  Similarly, when prosecutors are not often obliged 
to make timely, complete expert disclosures (and verify before doing so that 
their experts have met the requirements of Rule 702), they too can become 
less vigilant in monitoring their potential experts, the sufficiency of the facts 
on which those experts base their opinions, and the reliability of those 
experts’ principles and methodology. 
When defense counsel infrequently demand full disclosure of information 
related to the government’s experts (and even less frequently challenge 
admissibility), they undermine their ability to recognize deficient expert 
opinions and their skill to challenge them effectively.  If prosecutors do not 
make timely, complete expert disclosures and defense attorneys do not 
demand disclosure or challenge the admissibility of government experts, the 
underlying premise of Daubert—that effective examination of the 
government expert by the defense attorney will help the trial judge properly 
exercise her gatekeeping responsibility by exposing shortcomings in the 
witnesses’ opinions24—may be compromised.  This compromise would 
result from insufficiently detailed information to assess reliability and 
 
 23. See Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/ 
[https://perma.cc/F3V2-REQN] (“Some 97 percent of federal felony convictions are the result 
of plea bargains.”). 
 24. In Daubert, the Court noted that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of 
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).  
Inexperienced counsel lacking access to qualified defense experts are not well suited to 
“vigorously” cross-examine government experts. 
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insufficient skill by counsel to develop the facts and arguments to clarify the 
issues that the judge must decide. 
D.  Difficulties Faced by Defense Counsel in Obtaining 
Defense Experts to Challenge Government Experts 
In the vast majority of federal criminal cases, defendants are represented 
by either federal public defenders or private counsel appointed pursuant to 
the Criminal Justice Act (CJA).25  While public defenders may have 
resources to locate and hire experts in criminal cases without the approval or 
assistance of the court, few CJA attorneys have the financial ability to hire 
defense experts without requesting advance approval from the presiding trial 
judge (without which CJA funds are not available to pay the expert).26  That 
means that in many criminal cases, the defense attorney must file a motion 
with the court to request authorization to hire an expert witness and justify 
the need to do so—something the government is never obligated to do. 
Further, as already noted, many of the experts called by the government in 
a criminal case are involved in the investigation of criminal cases or work for 
government crime labs.27  That means that prosecutors frequently work with 
their experts throughout the investigation of the case, becoming familiar with 
what they have done long before charges are filed.  In contrast, defense 
counsel, once their clients have been indicted and the speedy-trial clock has 
begun, have much less time to decide whether to seek a defense expert.  And 
they cannot even begin to make that decision until after they request and 
receive expert disclosures from the government.  Unlike Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(a)(2),28 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) does 
not require mandatory disclosure of the government’s experts and their 
opinions; the defense must request it.29  And if the defense does request it, 
Rule 16 does not impose a deadline by which the government must make its 
disclosure.30  So, unless the trial judge sets a date for expert disclosures, the 
defense must make its request and wait for the prosecution to make its 
disclosure.  Not all prosecutors do so promptly upon request and, not 
infrequently, defense counsel receive government expert disclosures too 
close to the trial date.  This poses real problems for the defendant who may 
be left with insufficient time to locate and get court approval for a defense 
expert. 
 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012); Criminal Justice Act:  At 50 Years, a Landmark in the 
Right to Counsel, U.S. COURTS (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
news/2014/08/20/criminal-justice-act-50-years-landmark-right-counsel [https://perma.cc/ 
8WJF-BKF3] (“Today, nearly 90 percent of federal criminal defendants are aided by lawyers, 
investigators and experts paid for under the Criminal Justice Act.”). 
 26. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). 
 27. See supra Part I.B. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(i) (requiring that in civil cases any party that intends to 
introduce expert testimony make proper disclosure of the opinions (and supporting basis) their 
experts will make “at least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for 
trial” unless otherwise ordered by the court). 
 29. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G). 
 30. See id. 
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Compounding this difficulty, when defense attorneys do decide to retain a 
defense expert, they may have difficulty finding one because many of the 
experts needed in criminal cases come from law enforcement.  Unless the 
defense attorney can find a retired or former government investigator, she 
will likely be unable to locate one from the ranks of currently employed law 
enforcement investigators.  As noted in the Federal Judicial Center’s 
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, “[a]dversarial testing [of expert 
testimony in criminal cases] presupposes advance notice of the content of the 
expert’s testimony and access to comparable expertise to evaluate that 
testimony.”31  Just how effectively can the defendant in a criminal case 
challenge the government’s expert testimony without access to a comparable 
defense expert to review the work done by the government’s expert and 
critique any factual insufficiencies or methodological shortcomings?  And 
without informed and skilled challenge by the defense, how is the trial judge 
to perform his gatekeeping duty and make the findings required by Rule 702 
and Daubert when deciding objections to government experts? 
E.  Insufficiently Detailed Disclosure of Expert Opinions 
Under the Criminal Procedure Rules 
As noted above,32 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) 
imposes an obligation on the government to disclose expert testimony it 
intends to introduce at trial.33  The Rule states: 
At the defendant’s request, the government must give to the defendant a 
written summary of any testimony that the government intends to use under 
Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-
chief at trial. . . .  The summary provided under this subparagraph must 
describe the witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, 
and the witness’s qualifications.34 
At first glance, this seems pretty reasonable.  But contrast the disclosure 
requirement in Rule 16(a)(1)(G) with its counterpart in the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and (B): 
[A] party must disclose to the other parties the identify of any witness it 
may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 
703, or 705. 
. . . Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, this disclosure must 
be accompanied by a written report—prepared and signed by the witness—
if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert 
 
 31. Paul C. Giannelli, Edward J. Imwinkelried & Joseph L. Peterson, Reference Guide on 
Forensic Identification Expertise, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 55, 124 (3d ed. 2011); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes to 
1993 amendment (“[Rule 16’s expert disclosure provision] is intended to minimize surprise 
that often results from unexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continuances and to 
provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merit of the expert’s testimony through 
focused cross-examination.”). 
 32. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 33. A reciprocal obligation is imposed on the defense. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(C). 
 34. Id. r. 16(a)(1)(G). 
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testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party’s employee regularly 
involve giving expert testimony.  The report must contain: 
(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the 
basis and reasons for them; 
(ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them; 
(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; 
(iv) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all publications 
authored in the previous 10 years; 
(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the 
witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and 
(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and 
testimony in the case.35 
Which disclosure would you rather have if you had to prepare to challenge 
the testimony of an adversary’s expert?  The answer is obvious.  The 
disclosure requirement in the civil rules is significantly more robust.  It 
requires that the expert sign a written report.36  This prevents an expert from 
distancing herself from vagueness, incompleteness, or inaccuracy in the 
report by attributing its contents to an attorney who drafted it (as usually is 
the case for most discovery disclosures and responses in civil and criminal 
cases), rather than the expert.  It must contain a complete statement of all 
opinions that will be given at trial and the basis and reasons for them.37  This 
allows the cross-examining attorney to prevent the expert from engaging in 
the abusive practice of “testifying beyond the report,” adding at trial opinions 
or supporting facts not found in the written report.  It also prevents the expert 
from only offering conclusions without providing the supporting reasons and 
bases underlying them.  The report also must contain the facts or data 
considered by the expert (not just the facts that the expert intends to rely 
upon), as well as any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support the 
expert’s trial testimony.38  This prevents an expert from cherry-picking 
favorable facts to support his opinions without disclosing unfavorable ones, 
which, when known, can show that the opinion is not well founded. 
To even a casual observer, the expert disclosures required by the Rules of 
Civil Procedure are far more robust, detailed, and helpful to the recipient than 
those required by the Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Further, in civil cases, 
the parties can also depose an opposing expert,39 which affords the 
opportunity to further flesh out the expert’s opinions, methodology, and 
supporting factual basis.  If lawyers in civil cases then challenge the 
admissibility of an expert’s opinion, they have substantially more 
information to support their challenge than criminal lawyers do because 
depositions of experts in criminal cases are only available in exceptional 
 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
 36. Id. r. 26(a)(2)(B). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. r. 26(b)(4)(A). 
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circumstances and to preserve testimony for trial.40  In contrast to the 
comprehensive disclosures in civil cases, in criminal cases, most of the expert 
disclosures I have seen41 were cursory as well as conclusory, and not 
particularly useful for cross-examining the expert or challenging her 
testimony.  They certainly were insufficient to be of much help to me in 
making a ruling on admissibility of the expert’s opinions. 
Recently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) provided supplemental 
guidance (“DOJ Supplemental Guidance”) to prosecutors regarding the 
disclosure of forensic evidence and experts.42  Commendably, the 
memorandum accompanying the DOJ Supplemental Guidance emphasizes 
that “prosecutors must ensure that they satisfy their discovery obligations 
regarding forensic evidence and experts, so that defendants have a fair 
opportunity to understand the evidence that could be used against them.”43  
It clarifies that there are three distinct disclosure obligations that the criminal 
rules impose on prosecutors related to forensic evidence:  (1) Rule 
16(a)(1)(F) (the duty to turn over the results or reports of any scientific test 
or experiment), (2) Rule 16(a)(1)(G) (the duty to provide a written summary 
of expert testimony the government intends to use at trial), and (3) Rule 
16(a)(1)(E) (more broadly requiring production of documents and items 
material to preparing the defense).44  Helpfully, the DOJ Supplemental 
Guidance stresses that these disclosure obligations (augmented by others that 
may be required by the Jencks Act,45 or the Brady v. Maryland46 and Giglio 
v. United States47 decisions) “are the minimum requirements, and the 
Department’s discovery policies call for disclosure beyond these 
thresholds.”48 
In addition, the DOJ Supplemental Guidance recommends that DOJ 
prosecutors obtain the forensic examiner’s laboratory report and turn it over 
to the defense if requested.49  The DOJ also recommends that the written 
summary required by Rule 16(a)(1)(G) should “summarize the analyses 
performed by the forensic expert and describe any conclusions reached” and 
should “be sufficient to explain the basis and reasons for the expert’s 
expected testimony.”50  Further, prosecutors are encouraged to provide the 
defense with “a copy of, or access to, the laboratory of forensic expert’s ‘case 
 
 40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. 
 41. Remember that the trial judge does not see the disclosure unless there is a challenge 
because the disclosure only is served on the defense attorney, not docketed on the court record. 
Id. r. 16. 
 42. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE FOR PROSECUTORS 
REGARDING CRIMINAL DISCOVERY INVOLVING FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND EXPERTS (2017). 
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file,’” which “normally will describe the facts or data considered by the 
forensic expert, include the underlying documentation of the examination or 
analysis performed, and contain the material necessary for another examiner 
to understand the expert’s report.”51 
The DOJ Supplemental Guidance, if it continues as DOJ policy, and to the 
extent that prosecutors adhere to it, will go a long way to bolster the anemic 
disclosure requirements currently found in Rule 16(a)(1)(G).  But the 
effectiveness of the DOJ Supplemental Guidance is muted by its narrow 
application to forensic evidence and expert reports, as opposed to the many 
other types of expert testimony referenced above52 that are common to 
criminal prosecutions. 
II.  SUGGESTIONS FOR TRIAL JUDGES 
So, what should a trial judge do to overcome the challenges discussed 
above when called on to make rulings regarding the admissibility of expert 
testimony in criminal cases?  The starting point is to have firmly in mind the 
two things that a judge must have in order to make proper rulings:  (1) the 
underlying facts related to the challenged evidence and (2) sufficient time to 
digest the facts and make a principled ruling.  Fortunately, judges have the 
inherent authority to ensure that they get what they need to do the job.  This 
Part discusses that inherent authority, how judges should exercise that 
authority, and what rule changes should be made to help judges better 
exercise that authority. 
A.  Address Disclosure of Expert Opinions Early in the Case 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.1 states:  “On its own, or on a 
party’s motion, the court may hold one or more pretrial conferences to 
promote a fair and expeditious trial.  When a conference ends, the court must 
prepare and file a memorandum of any matters agreed to during the 
conference.”53  This Rule allows a judge to schedule a preliminary pretrial 
conference early—right after the defendant has been arraigned.  At that time, 
the court can discuss the case in general, get details from the attorneys about 
the status of discovery, set deadlines for getting discovery done, and inquire 
about likely expert testimony.  While the government might take the position 
that the preliminary pretrial conference is too early to make firm decisions 
about trial experts, a judge must be prepared to take this with a grain of salt.  
After all, the prosecutor has supervised the investigation and charging of the 
defendant, including presenting witnesses to the grand jury.  It takes an 
inexperienced (or disingenuous) prosecutor to claim that he has no idea 
during the early stage of a case about what kind of expert testimony may be 
offered.  The goal is not to lock the parties in too early but to raise the issue 
so that the court can set a reasonable schedule for when expert disclosures 
will be made, motions in limine challenging experts filed, and a hearing (if 
 
 51. Id. at 3. 
 52. See supra Part I.B. 
 53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1. 
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needed) scheduled sufficiently far in advance of trial so that the judge has 
adequate time to make a thoughtful ruling. 
B.  Make Your Expectations About Expert Disclosures 
Clearly Known at the Outset 
Judges should feel free to let counsel for the government and defendant 
know at the start of the case that they will insist on compliance with both the 
letter and spirit of what Rule 16 requires for expert disclosures.  While the 
shortcomings of Rule 16 itself have been discussed above,54 the judge can 
get valuable assistance from the advisory committee notes that supplement 
the Rule.  For example, the advisory committee’s notes to the 1993 
amendment to Rule 16 are especially helpful.  The following excerpts are a 
sampling of the useful guidance the notes afford. 
The comment first provides that Rule 16, as amended, “is intended to 
minimize surprise that often results from unexpected expert testimony, 
reduce the need for continuances, and to provide the opponent with a fair 
opportunity to test the merit of the expert’s testimony through focused cross-
examination.”55  When combined with the language of Rule 17.1, this 
supports the judge’s ability to build into the pretrial schedule reasonable 
deadlines (reached after consulting with counsel) for making expert 
disclosures, filing motions in limine, and scheduling an evidentiary hearing 
if needed.  It further underscores the ability of a judge to advise the lawyers 
for both the government and the defendant that it will insist that the expert 
disclosures be detailed, meaningful, complete, and not boilerplate or 
conclusory.  Otherwise, they will be useless to minimize the risk of surprise 
and continuance requests.  And boilerplate expert disclosures do not provide 
a fair opportunity to test the expert’s opinions or effectively cross-examine. 
The comment then notes that 
With increased use of both scientific and nonscientific expert testimony, 
one of counsel’s most basic discovery needs is to learn that an expert is 
expected to testify.  This is particularly important if the expert is expected 
to testify on matters which touch on new or controversial techniques or 
opinions.  The amendment is intended to meet this need by first, requiring 
notice of the expert’s qualifications which in turn will permit the requesting 
party to determine whether in fact the witness is an expert within the 
definition of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.56 
This advisory note language is important because so many experts in criminal 
trials testify to nonscientific matters (e.g., fingerprint analysis, bite-mark 
analysis, toolmark evidence, and ballistic evidence).57  The Rule 16 
disclosures need to be detailed enough so that these kinds of nonscientific 
opinion testimony (for which there may not be peer-reviewed literature, 
known testing procedures, established error rates, or standard testing 
 
 54. See supra Part I.E. 
 55. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment. 
 56. Id. (citations omitted). 
 57. See supra Part I.B. 
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protocols) can be explored by counsel and brought to the attention of the court 
when ruling on any challenge to the evidence. 
The comment continues to note that the 
requesting party is entitled to a summary of the expected testimony.  This 
provision is intended to permit more complete pretrial preparation by the 
requesting party.  For example, this should inform the requesting party 
whether the expert will be providing only background information on a 
particular issue or whether the witness will actually offer an opinion.58 
It is clear that in order for the Rule 16 disclosure to fulfill this purpose, it 
must be detailed, not boilerplate, and set forth each discrete opinion the 
expert is expected to give, as well as the factual basis supporting it.  The judge 
should make it clear to counsel that this level of detail is required.  This can 
be enforced by ordering that expert disclosures also be filed with the court by 
a specific date and then holding a status conference (in person or by 
telephone) once they have been provided to discuss whether the disclosures 
are sufficiently detailed.  If not, the court can order that they be 
supplemented. 
Finally, the comment provides that Rule 16 requires that the requesting 
party be provided with 
a summary of the bases of the expert’s opinion. . . .  That should cover not 
only written and oral reports, tests, reports, and investigations, but any 
information that might be recognized as a legitimate basis for an opinion 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, including opinions of other experts.59 
Once again, this advisory note language underscores the obligation to include 
detailed information, not conclusory boilerplate, in expert disclosures.  
Judges who make sure the attorneys know this early in the case are more 
likely to see substantive disclosures, which will fulfill the purpose of the 
disclosure rule and make it easier for the judge to make admissibility rulings. 
C.  Know Where to Look for Helpful Information to Give You the 
Background Needed to Rule on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
If the Rule 16 expert disclosures and the briefing by counsel on a motion 
to exclude (or admit) expert testimony in a criminal trial do not provide the 
judge with enough information to fulfill her gatekeeping role under Daubert 
and Rule 702, where can the judge turn to find publicly available information 
to feel better prepared to rule?  Fortunately, there are many reference 
materials that are available.  This section highlights three. 
One of the best is the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence prepared 
by the Federal Judicial Center and the National Research Council.60  It 
contains an excellent discussion of the legal standards for admissibility of 
expert testimony, a discussion of how science works, as well as reference 
guides on forensic identification, DNA identification evidence, statistics, 
 
 58. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See generally REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 31. 
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multiple regression, survey research, estimation of economic damages, 
epidemiology, toxicology, medical testimony, neuroscience, mental health 
evidence, and engineering.61  Each reference guide is written to be 
understandable to lay readers, comprehensive enough to give the reader a real 
feel for the issues associated with the discipline discussed, and yet is not so 
long that it cannot be read in a reasonably short period of time.  Each contains 
references to other helpful materials that may be consulted for more 
information. 
Because forensic evidence is prevalent in criminal cases, two reports on 
this subject may be very helpful.  The most recent is the September 2016 
report to the President from the President’s Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology (PCAST) titled Forensic Science in Criminal Courts:  
Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods.62  The PCAST 
report contains thorough discussions regarding the following forensic 
feature-comparison methodologies:  DNA analysis (single-source samples, 
simple-mixture source samples, and complex-mixture source samples), bite-
mark analysis, latent fingerprint analysis, firearms analysis, footwear 
analysis, and hair analysis.63 
The third useful reference is the National Research Council’s February 
2009 report titled Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States:  A 
Path Forward.64  In addition to a useful discussion about what forensic 
science is and the legal standards for admitting forensic evidence in court 
cases, it contains helpfully detailed discussions about the following forensic 
science disciplines:  biological evidence, analysis of controlled substances, 
friction-ridge analysis, shoe-print and tire-track analysis, toolmark and 
firearms identification, hair-evidence analysis, fiber-evidence analysis’s 
questioned document examination, paint and coatings analysis, explosives- 
and fire-debris evidence, forensic odontology, bloodstain-pattern analysis, 
and digital and multimedia analysis.65 
These three references are especially helpful to judges faced with ruling 
on admissibility of expert evidence in criminal trials.  They provide sufficient 
background information to allow a judge to understand the critical 
evidentiary issues with various types of recurring expert evidence in criminal 
cases.  When combined with research on court decisions discussing the 
admissibility of expert evidence in criminal cases, a judge can feel well 
prepared to make a ruling, even if the Rule 16 disclosures and filings of the 
parties are insufficient in themselves to enable the judge to rule. 
 
 61. See generally id. 
 62. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF 
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D.  Recommended Amendment to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 
A final suggestion to make life easier for trial judges and counsel alike is 
a recommendation that the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee consider 
amending Rule 16 to enhance the Rule 16(a)(1)(G) and (b)(1)(C) expert 
disclosures.  Specifically, the Committee should consider whether they 
should be made to more closely resemble the disclosures required in civil 
cases by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2).  At a minimum, Rule 16 
disclosures should include (1) a complete statement of each opinion the 
expert will testify to, as well as the basis and reasons supporting them; (2) a 
summary of the facts or data considered (not just relied on) by the witness in 
forming her opinions; and (3) a description of the witness’s qualifications.  In 
addition, while less important, it would also bolster Rule 16 if the disclosures 
included a list of cases in the past four years where the witness had testified 
(allowing counsel to read the prior testimony) and a copy of any exhibits that 
will be used by the expert in support of her testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
Determining the admissibility of expert testimony can be a challenge to 
trial judges under the best of circumstances.  But in criminal cases, there are 
additional challenges the judge faces in doing so.  Understanding what these 
challenges are and how best to meet them can make life much easier for the 
judge.  In addition, fortifying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16’s expert 
disclosure requirements to make them more similar to the helpful ones found 
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) would also greatly improve 
things. 
 
